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This paper presents the results of the fourth in a sequence of experiments conducted by the
Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control research team.  The focus of this study is on
the relative effectiveness of three organizational structures in the conduct of a simulated Joint
Task Force mission.  Two of the three organizational architectures were optimized, using pre-
experimental modeling, to limit the amount of inter-nodal coordination. These two structures
varied in level of workload (4-node vs. 6-node).  The third structure was based on a more
traditional, functional design that required more inter-nodal coordination than them model-based
structures.  Effectiveness was evaluated in terms of performance on the more predictable primary
mission tasks as well as some less predictable tasks and a measure of general protection of the
force. Overall,  there is limited evidence that the 6-node structure designed to reduce inter-nodal
coordination performed more effectively than the other two on the primary mission tasks.  There
is also limited evidence that the traditional structure that required more coordination in
accomplishing primary t sks, was more effective than the model-based structures in responding
to the less predictable tasks.  This evidence supports the value of coordination capabilities in
responding to situations of uncertainty.
1.  Background
The issues of change and continuity in command and control, the theme for the 1999 CCRP
Symposium, are at the heart of the research conducted by the Adaptive Architectures for
Command and Control (A2C2) research team.  This team comprised of university, government,
industry and military participants has conducted, over several years, a series of simulation
experiments that examine varying dimensions of command and control (structural distribution of
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assets, authority, communications systems, decision making, etc.) and their relationship to
organizational performance and organizational adaptability.  The purpose of this paper is to
present some of the results of the most recent experiment conducted in 1998 (Experiment 4).
This experiment extends the findings of prior experiments that have been reported in previous
symposium proceedings.
A major focus of the previous (third) experiment was on the willingness of officers, playing the
role of a Joint Task Force (JTF), to change the organization’s structure in the face of a trigger
event.  The hypothesis, based both on change theory and previous A2C2 research, was that
participants would choose a structure that was more familiar (A0-6) over an alternative structure
(A1-4) that had been determined through pre-experimental modeling to be optimal for
accomplishing the mission tasks facing the JTF.  Full reports on this experiment are presented in
the 1998 conference proceedings [see for example, Benson, et al. 1998; Curry et al. 1998; Entin
et al. 1998; Handley, et al. 1998; Hocevar, 1998; Hocevar et al. 1998].  In Experiment 3, teams
were all initially trained in structure A0-6 (traditional).  After the training, teams were briefed
that there was going to be a significant reduction in assets (due to a conflict in another region).
Three reduced asset structures were proposed.  One structure maintained the key structural form
of A0-6 with assets reduced. The other two structures (A1-4 and A1-52) were derived from pre-
experimental modeling to reduce the amount coordination required across organizational
“nodes.” The pre-experimental modeling hypothesized that structures that reduced the need for
coordination by assigning task-defined assets to individual commanders would perform more
effectively than the more traditional/functionally defined structure that would necessitate
internodal coordination for task accomplishment.
Two important findings in Experiment 3 influenced the design and focus of Experiment 4.  First,
all of the nine six-person teams of military officers (rank 03-05) participating in this experiment
chose the more traditional and coordination intensive structure (A0-6) as the one with which they
could most effectively perform the mission rather than either of the two “optimized” alternatives.
This, on the surface, confirmed the hypothesis of preference for “proximal” over “optimal”
structure.  However, interesting insights emerged from the officers’ justification for this choice
[Hocevar, 1998; Hocevar t al., 1998].  They explained that A0-6 would allow them to be more
effective both due to it’s similarity with traditional military structure and their experience with
this structure in the training phase of the simulation.  This finding reflects the military’s strong
emphasis on training and rehearsal.  The second major rationale was the more insightful.  Teams
also argued that, because the A0-6 structure required coordination among component
commanders, it offered performance advantages.  Specifically, they saw the required
coordination as both facilitating adaptive response to unexpected events and encouraging
commanders to maintain a full mission perspective and not become overly focused on their
assigned tasks.  Some officers argued that this structure would thus provide better overall
protection of the force.
A second, unanticipated, finding from Experiment 3 was that the A0-6 structure chosen by all 9
teams outperformed the A1-4 structure that had been predicted to be more effective based on the
pre-experimental optimization and modeling.  Benson et al. (1998) provided some analyses to
explain this anomalous finding.  Because A1-4 was designed for nodal commanders to perform
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tasks autonomously, they frequently had to simultaneously utilize multiple assets toward a
significant target.   In the training preparation for the experiment, participants had practiced
coordination, but this practice had emphasized coordination with other team members.  The
reduced accuracy of teams using the A1-4 structure suggests that their performance may be an
artifact of training that did not adequately prepare players to perform multi-asset tasks
autonomously.   A second possible explanation is the confounding aspect of workload.  While
A1-4 reduced the workload inherent in inter-nodal coordination, teams in this structure still faced
the same mission tasks as A0-6, but with two fewer nodal commanders.
2. Relevant Theoretical Concepts3
A major focus of this study is on the role of coordination capability in adapting to environmental
uncertainty or less routine task demands.  Contingency theorists argue that organizational
effectiveness is influenced by the degree of “fit” between the requirements of the environment
and the characteristics of the organization [Burton & Obel, 1998].  For example, substantial
research in organization theory has demonstrated that  a ask-based (divisional) organization with
largely autonomous units can be highly effective in situations where the environment can be
segmented (e.g., by task domains) and is fairly stable and predictable [Duncan, 1979].  This type
of situation has limited information processing needs and low requirements for coordination.
However, organization theory also suggests that this type of structure may be less effective at
responding to unanticipated requirements for coordination across divisions [Mintzberg, 1993].
In situations of uncertainty, lateral coordination capabilities can enhance an organization’s ability
to adapt to meet the increased information processing requirements [Galbraith, 1977, 1995].
While the definition of “uncertainty” in organization theory has not been totally uniform, the
following characteristics cited by Burton and Obel [1998] are common:  complexity (i.e., number
of variables), unpredictability (reduced awareness of relevant data), interdependence, and rate of
change.
Weick and Roberts [1993] developed the concept of “collective mind” to explain the effective
behavior of highly interdependent activities in the high risk environment of aircraft carriers.
They found that success in such a dynamic, complex, fast-paced environment results from
“heedful interrelating” of activities that creates a pattern of joint action.   Using a very different
sized organization, Waller [1999] examined the effectiveness of flight crews in response to
nonroutine events.  She found that crews that were able to more quickly identify a non-routine
event, distribute critical information, re-prioritize their tasks, and adjust task distributions were
more effective than those whose behaviors were more fixed in the dominant routine activities.
3. Purpose
The focus of this study (Experiment 4) is to clarify the findings from Experiment 3 and further
examine the role of coordination in performance of both planned and unanticipated tasks.  The
first issue is to clarify the role of training adequacy on the performance of the A1-4 structure.
The experimental design and simulation training for Experiment 4 was modified to assure that
participants were fully familiar with their role, the assets they were responsible for, the overall
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structure they were part of, and the software requirements for “coordinated attacks.” With the
biasing factor of training differences removed, the optimized, model-based Architectures are
predicted to outperform the traditional structure that has increased requirements for inter-nodal
coordination.  A second clarification of Experiment 3 is to understand the role of workload in
performance.  The design of the alternative organizational structures tested in Experiment 4
(described below) address this question.
Finally, a focal of purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that emerged from the
justification given by the military officers for their choice of A0-6 structure in Experiment 3
[Hocevar, 1998; Hocevar t al., 1998].  As noted above, many argued that this structure would
be more effective in response to unanticipated events and more effective in the general protection
of the force because it required coordination.  They felt the practiced coordination would make
them more adaptive and keep individual nodal commanders focused on the total mission rather
than autonomous sub-tasks.   Thus, this study examines the following research question:  When
faced with the need to respond to an unanticipated, complex, task, does a structure that requires
some inter-unit coordination provide a performance advantage over a structure that minimizes
coordination by using a task-based design?
4. Method
4.1 Sample
Study participants were 54 military officers in varying Master of Science programs at the Naval
Postgraduate School.  Table 1 presents the breakdown by service.  Eleven of the participants
were foreign national officers from a variety of nations (e.g., Norway, Turkey, Ukraine,
Hungary, Senegal).  Of these, six were navy, four army and one air force.  More than 90% of the
total group were of rank 03 and 04.  Four of the foreign national officers were rank 05 and one
was 02.  Of the U.S. officers, 13 were Special Operations.   All but one of the participants were
male.
  Table 1.  Service Representation of Study Participants
USN          USA          USMC          USAF          USCG          International            TOTAL
 19               12                6                    4                   2                      11                         54
Teams of six members were constituted by random assignment, maintaining a balance across
teams in terms of service, operational vs. support experience, and U.S. vs. foreign national
origin.  At least one foreign national officer was assigned to each team.  While not part of the
experimental design, this provided a unique opportunity to simulate not just a joint service, but a
coalition engagement.
4.2 Scenario
The teams were asked to play the role of a Joint Task Force (JTF) and presented a scenario in
which the U.S. is taking action in support of an ally, Country Green, that has been invaded by
neighboring Country Orange.  The ultimate objectives of this mission are to secure Country
Green’s Airport and Port.  A mission briefing document that outlined a specific chronology of
mission tasks to be undertaken by the JTF was distributed to all participants.  A greatly
simplified version is listed below.  A graphic summary is presented in Figure 1:
1. Amphibious forces will land and take North and South Beach after clearing
mines.  (Note:  2 INF (Infantry) and 1 CAS (Close Air Support) are shown in
the figure as one option for accomplishing these mission tasks)
2. Prior to taking N. Beach, infantry (INF) and air support will seize and hold the
hill overlooking the beach.
3. Infantry will move down roads from S. Beach toward airport and from N.
Beach to Port clearing mines and enemy tanks.
4. Special Operations Force (SOF) and satellite (SAT) must determine which of
two roads the enemy plans to use for insertion of forces by assessing traffic.
Once the enemy “lead vehicle” is identified, it should be destroyed as well as
the bridge being used by that vehicle, while retaining second bridge for
friendly traffic.
5. Armored counterattack forces are believed to be at the Airport and Port.  If
present, the must be identified and destroyed.























































































6. Both the Port and Airport must be captured and held.  The attack on the
Airport has priority and should occur first if they cannot be attacked
simultaneously.
The above mission tasks are assumed to represent a high level of certainty.  They all MUST
occur, and the sequencing, location, and assets required for each task are clearly specified and
documented for team participants.  With the exception of clearing the land and sea mines, all of
the above mission tasks are somewhat complex in that they required multiple assets to
accomplish (e.g., infantry (INF) and close air support (CAS)).  Because of the focus in the paper
on the role of coordination, the major mission tasks requiring multiple assets will be one focus of
the analysis.
The mission briefing document also defined “Other Tasks That Can Occur Throughout The
Operation.”   Of interest to this research paper are only those that require multiple assets.   The
two tasks in this category are detecting and destroying Silkworm and SAM sites. These tasks
represent higher level of uncertainty in that they “pop up” as the simulation unfolds.  In contrast
with the major mission tasks, the exact location and timing of these tasks is not known by the
JTF decision makers.  These tasks are also of moderate complexity in that two different assets
(close air support with either satellite or SOF) are required.
4.3  Independent variables:  Organizational structure
As in Experiment 3, three organizational structures were evaluated in terms of their impact on
performance effectiveness.  Figure 2 presents the three structures and shows the distribution of
assets among the JTF decision makers.4 A0-6 represents the more traditional, functionally
defined structure and is identical to the one used in Experiment 3.  A multi-objective
optimization procedure similar to the one described by Levchuk et al. [1998] was used to define
the A1-4 and A1-6 structures. This optimization process is based on a complex analysis of
resource and task vectors.  The major objectives used in the optimization process were reduced
requirements for coordination, geographic proximity, and workload. The primary differentiating
feature between the two model-based structures is number of “nodes.” Thus, the impact of
workload on performance can be assessed by comparing A1-4 and A1-6.  Comparison of A0-6
with the two model-based structures provides a test for this study’s focal question of the impact
of coordination requirements on organizational performance.
Figure 2 also indicates the use of communication nets as part of the structural definition of each
architecture.  For both A1-6 and A0-6, communication was divided between two networks with
“Blue” playing the communication coordinator.  A1-4 represented a “flattened” organization
with reduced hierarchy and a single communication net.
The experiment was designed such that each team would employ two different organizational
structures in the accomplishment of the specified mission using the DDD-III simulator.
Assignments were counterbalanced across the total set for order effect.  In the first round of
trials, 3 teams were assigned structure A1-4.  Given teams defined in sets of six, there were
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enough participants to constitute an additional team.  The same was true (of a different set of 3
teams) in round two.  These teams of four were balanced in terms of demographics as described
above.  Thus, the overall design generated data trials from seven teams for A1-6 and A0-6 and
data trials from six teams for A1-4.
The key characteristics of organizational structure to be examined as independent variables in
this research are:  optimized vs. non-optimized (i.e., low vs. high coordination requirements for
major mission tasks) and number of organizational nodes (i.e., workload).
4.4  Training
In addition to the mission briefing document summarized above, participants received additional
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Figure 2.  Three Organizational Architectures
and friendly assets and the capabilities of each of these assets.  A third matrix defined each
specific task and the resource requirements needed for its accomplishment.  This matrix included
recommended and optional “force packages” that could be used (e.g., 1 INF, 1 CAS, and DDG to
take N. Beach).  Finally, participants also received a training manual in how to use the
Distributed Dynamic Decisionmaking-III (DDD-III) simulation software.5
The question addressed in Experiment 3 of the role of “familiarity” over “optimality” as factors
influencing choice of structure was not part of Experiment 4.  Thus “familiarity” did not need to
be a manipulated variable.  This allowed participants to receive equivalent training in both of the
organizational structures they would use in the simulation trials. Training occurred in two
phases.  First, participants received 1-2 hours of individual level training in the use of the DDD
software. (The additional training was provided to increase criterion proficiency with the
software as determined by both self-selection and observation of trainers).  At the end of the
software training, individuals were given a handout that graphically presented the organizational
structure (similar to Figure 2) they would use in their first trial.
Each team was scheduled into the simulation lab at for two 3-hour blocks that combined two
training and one data trial for each of the two structures they were assigned.  When teams arrived
at the lab, they self-determined who would be assigned to each specific node command position.
This enhanced the “fit” between expertise and the type of tasks and assets each would be
responsible for in the mission simulation.  During the first two hours, teams went through two
training runs that were similar to the ultimate mission simulation in terms of the major task
requirements and chronology, though somewhat slower in pace and with less demand in terms of
hostile threats requiring defensive action.  The third hour was dedicated to the data trial and
follow-up paper-and-pencil self-report measures [see Entin, 1999] and a brief After Action
Review (AAR).
4.5  Dependent Measures
Entin [1999] has prepared a companion paper on Experiment 4 that is presented in this
Proceedings.  This paper provides additional data on the comparative effectiveness of the three
organizational architectures.  The primary measures used by Entin are derived from two sources.
He utilizes the aggregate measures of performance derived from DDD-III:  Mission Score and
Strength Score.  He also evaluates the task-level and aggregate ratings of expert observers of
both task effectiveness and teamwork behaviors.
To evaluate the training adequacy, the analysis of Mission and Strength scores will also be
presented here. However, the major analytic focus of the paper presented here is on more
“micro” measures of effectiveness generated by DDD-III and reported in the software’s
“Dependent Variable File” for each run of the simulation.  These measures include objective
assessments of task-level performance.   “Task Accuracy” is calculated based on the extent to
which teams met the vector of requirements (i.e., used an appropriate combination of assets) in
accomplishing that task.  Scores are based on 100% and decrements reflect both inadequate force
application or when combined attacks are not coordinated within a specified time limit [see
Kleinman & Young, 1997 for more details on task score calculations].
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There are two categories of Task Accuracy measures used in this analysis.  The first is the set of
seven major offensive mission tasks that were defined in the mission briefing.  These tasks
represent a high degree of certainty in that the requirements, timing, asset options, location, etc.
are all known in advance; thus they are taken as measures of highly pr dictable tasks.  Defining
these tasks as “certain” does not suggest that the environment they were to take place in was
totally predictable.  In particular, the defend tasks against aircraft, submarines, patrol boats were
known in general, but the particular location and timing was uncertain.  Most of the defensive
tasks required only a single asset and thus could not be used to test the role of coordination in
adapting to an uncertain environment.  However, two task categories were identified  as
representing both higher uncertainty and the requirement of coordination6 -- hostile SAM and
Silkworm missile sites.  These two task categories required teams to be “heedful” in order to
“observe” their appearance in the mission domain [following Weick & Roberts, 1993].  They
also required an interruption of the priority offensive mission tasks and change in the immediate
task focus of certain decision makers [following Waller, 1999].   The two categories of Task
Accuracy measures are listed below:
Tasks Representing Tasks Representing








The above discussion has implications to the assessment of the focal concept of “adaptability.”
In Experiment 3, a trigger event (reducing assets) was used as the situational change requiring
teams to decide how to adapt by identifying their “preferred” organizational structure.  In the
absence of a similar significant trigger event in Experiment 4, “adaptation” could not be
operationalized in the same way.  In this study, “adaptation” is defined in terms of a team’s
ability to shift focus from the primary “certain” mission tasks to the more uncertain,
unanticipated events that involve some coordinated resource response.  This characterization of
adaptation is in line with the tenets of organization theory described in the literature review.
Thus, the test of “adaptability” will assessed by the comparative performance of the three
organizational architectures on the “uncertain” tasks defined above.
In addition to the task accuracy scores, the DDD-III dependent variable file records the number
of organizational nodes involved in each task.  These data will be analyzed to determine the
degree coordinated behavior was used and the correlation of degree of coordination with
performance results.  The final measure to be analyzed from the DDD-III dependent variable file
is the “number of hostile penetrations.”  This score is used to test the officers’ rationale for the
choice of A0-6 in Experiment 3:   Is a structure requiring coordination among organizational
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nodes (i.e., A0-6) more effective in the general protection of the forces than those that are task-
designed to increase nodal autonomy (A1-6 and A1-4).
5. Results and Discussion
As described in the Method section above, the experimental design allowed for six data trials for
A1-4 and seven data trials for A1-6 and A0-6.  Unfortunately, the simulator “crashed” during
one of the A1-4 data trials thus decreasing the sample for this cell to five.  In analyzing data from
training runs, only the second (final) training runs were included.  Again, one trial run “crashed”
for a team conducting A0-6. In addition, while DDD-III task level data were available, the
summary Mission and Strength scores were lost from two additional training runs (A0-6 and A1-
4).  These variations from the original design will be reflected in the samples sizes reported in
analyses below.
5.1  Training Effect
The first set of analyses focused on the question from Experiment 3 as to whether a difference in
training effectiveness biased the comparative performance of the three Architectures.  Two
overall measures of performance derived from DDD-III were used.  Mission score reflects the
extent to which teams accomplished all tasks (not just the 7 primary tasks listed above) with the
appropriate resources.  At the beginning of a simulation, the score starts at zero and cumulates to
a possible score of 100%.    Strength score starts at 100% and decrements accrue to reflect such
things as enemy “hits,” collisions,  and mission tasks attempted with inadequate resources (as
defined by the vector of task requirements).
An initial test of the difference between the last training run and the trial run on Mission and
Strength scores shows that the teams were still making adjustments to their strategy in the trial.
The Mission score significantly increased in the trial run as compared with training; but Strength
score significantly decreased (see Table 2). This finding suggests that teams were focused on
Table 2.  Comparison of Mission and
Strength Scores for Training vs. Trial Runs
                       Training         Trial
                        (N=17)         (N=19)
Mission              72.2              81.5*
                         (10.1)            (12.9)
Strength              85.0             80.1*
                           (3.9)             (6.7)
* p<.05 using 2-tailed t-test (df=34)
improving their performance on the mission tasks and this priority led to a small, but significant
decrease in their effectiveness in dealing with factors such as hostile unanticipated threats.
To determine whether there was a different effect for training depending on the type of
organizational architecture, a follow-up evaluation was conducted.  A within-team difference
score was calculated between each team’s Mission score on the second (final) training run and
trial run for a specific architecture.  A similar difference score was calculated for Strength.  A
one-way ANOVA found no significant differences for the effect of architecture on the training
vs. trial difference scores for either the Mission or Strength scores.   Thus, there is no bias based
on training differentially effecting the performance of the three architectures.  Figure 3 ill strates
that the pattern of increase in Mission scores and decrease in Strength scores between training
and trial runs is consistent across the three architectures.






















5.2  Comparative Performance on Primary Mission Tasks by Three Architectures
As described in the Method section above, each team had three opportunities to apply a given
architecture to the accomplishment of the simulated mission.  Two of these were training trials
and one was the actual “data” trial.   However, DDD-III data were being gathered during the
second training trial as well as the final data trial.   Because of the limited sample size in each
condition (i.e., Architecture type), data from the final (second) training run were combined with
the data from the actual intended trial run to attempt to increase the statistical power of analyses.
There are two justifications for this.  First, the trends in the results for the final training runs
followed a similar pattern to those from the trial runs.  This was demonstrated by a multivariate
ANOVA using Mission and Strength as the dependent variables and Architecture, Order, and the
interaction of these two factors as independent variables.  The interaction term was not
significant (p<.10) thus demonstrating that the relationship between Architecture and
performance measures was not dependent on whether data were from the second training run or
the actual data trial.
The second justification for including the training data is conceptual rather than statistical.  As
stated in the introduction, one of the major objectives of the A2C2 research project is to evaluate
how “adaptive” an architecture is.  The experimental assessment of “adaptation” is measured in
this study by how well teams respond to less predictable tasks.  But, another part of adaptation
can be interpreted by how well an architecture performs, even when teams are fairly
inexperienced with that architecture.  It is argued here, that by including the final training data
along with the trial data, we can better assess the effectiveness of the three architectures in regard
to the varying research questions.
5.2.1 Performance as Measured by Overall Mission and Strength Scores
Before presenting the task-level data that are the focus of this study, the results of the overall
measures provided by DDD-III are useful as a type of performance baseline.7  An ANOVA
comparing the three Architectures on both Mission and Strength scores was conducted and the
results are presented in Table 3.  The results show that the F-statistic was not significant for























Note:  Cells represent mean and (std dev).
Mission, thus the mean scores cannot be interpreted as different for the three Architectures.  In
contrast, the Strength scores are different, with a post hoc LSD test showing that the performance
of A1-6 is significantly stronger than that of A0-6 and A1-4 (p<.05).  Interestingly, the pattern of
means for Mission score is the same (i.e., A1-6 outperforming A0-6 and A1-4), but the high error
variance does not allow these differences to reach the level of statistical significance.  Thus,
there is only partial support for the hypothesis that the model-based structure (A1-6) outperforms
the traditional (A0-6) structure.  The finding that A1-6 also outperforms the model-based A1-4
architecture suggests that the higher workload required by A1-4 may impede performance that is
reflected in the Strength score.
5.2.2 Performance as Measured by Accuracy on Primary Offensive Mission Tasks
One of the intended contributions of this study was to examine the utility of task-level data
derived from DDD-III to enhance our understanding of the relative performance of varying
organizational architectures.  To that end, the task accuracy score for each of the seven major
mission objectives (defined as high in predictability) were analyzed using ANOVA with
Architecture as the independent variable.    Table 4 shows the ANOVA results.  Included in this
table are a composite score for these seven tasks (Total Accuracy) and the previously presented
overall Mission score.  [For purposes of clarity, standard deviations are omitted from this table.]
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Clearly, there is limited statistical evidence for the impact of Architecture on task performance
for the primary offensive mission tasks.  Only the Lead Vehicle task and the composite Total
Accuracy measure show significant main effect for Architecture (p < .10).  Post hoc tests to
compare pairs of means show the model-based structure A1-6 significantly outperforming both
the more traditional structure A0-6 and the second model-based structure A1-4 (using LSD test,
 p<.05).  While not reaching statistical significance, Table 4 shows a similar pattern of
performance for  all but one of the task measures (A1-6 outperforming A0-6 and A1-4). This
pattern is presented graphically in Figure 4.
Figure 4.  Task Accuracy for Primary Mission Tasks by Architecture
Table 4.  Mission Task Accuracy by Architecture
Task A1-6 A0-6 A1-4 F sig.
(N=14) (N=13) (N=11) level
N. Beach 98.4 95.6 84.3 0.18
S. Beach 99.8 94.1 100 0.28
Hill 87.4 94.2 98 0.32
Airport 100 88.2 95.5 0.22
Lead Veh. 82.1 73.1 45.5 0.09*
Bridge 80.6 64.3 58.2 0.41
Seaport 90.6 78.8 77.6 0.56
MISSION score 81.7 73.1 75.5 0.19
TOTAL Accuracy 91.3 84 79.9 .08*
* Significant F-statistic, p<.10






















Even though these results include both training and trial data, the sample size is still quite small
and thus the statistical analysis has limited power.  However, both the table of means and graphic
presentation above show a consistent pattern.  To further examine this pattern, a more descriptive
presentation of the results was compiled based on a within-team comparison.  Given the
experimental design, each team generated both training and trial data for two different structures.
A simple tally was made of the number of times one architecture outperformed the other (for the
same team) for each of the 7 primary mission tasks.  For example, if Team A was assigned to
both A1-6 and A0-6,  the task accuracy scores for both the training and trial events for “Hill”
were coded in one of three categories:  A1-6 > A0-6; A0-6 > A1-6; or no difference (i.e., scores
for Hill accuracy under both architecture conditions were equal).   This approach disregards the
degree of difference in accuracy scores.  However, it can be argued that a lower accuracy score
(even if small in absolute value) represents an objective determination of lesser performance in
either damage caused to the enemy or greater incurred losses to friendly forces.
Table 5 presents a summary of the tabulations described above.  By way of example, the first
data cell shows that there were a total of 42 trials (3 x 7 x 2 = 42; where 3= # of teams assigned
to both A1-4 and A1-6; 7 = # of mission task accuracy scores evaluated; and 2 = # of data runs
(final training and trial)).    Of these trials, 24 showed the team performing equally well using
both organizational architectures.  However, when they performed differently (18 of the 42
events) 83% of these differences showed A1-6 performing with more accuracy than A1-4.
The pattern of results comparing A1-6 with A0-6 shows a similar trend.  While there were fewer
trials (due to one “crashed” run and no available data), on 68% of the tasks where there were
differences in performance, A1-6 had higher performance accuracy than A0-6.  Interestingly, the
comparison of A1-4 and A0-6 shows no overall advantage of one over the other.  This
presentation of the data, while not demonstrating statistical significance, suggests a pattern of
results that merits further study to increase the sample size and thus the power of inferential
Table 5  Within Team Comparisons of Mission Task Accuracies by Architectures 
# of tasks % of total tasks % of task differences
A1-4 vs. A1-6
A1-6 > A1-4 15 36% 83%
A1-4 > A1-6 3 7% 17%
no difference 24 57%
A1-4 vs. A0-6
A1-4 > A0-6 9 26% 50%
A0-6 > A1-4 9 26% 50%
no difference 17 48%
A1-6 vs. A0-6
A1-6 > A0-6 13 37% 68%
A0-6 > A1-6 6 17% 32%
no difference 16 46%
analyses.  The summary shows evidence of support for the hypothesis that the model-based
structure (A1-6) with reduced coordination requirements outperforms the more traditional A0-6
with higher coordination requirements.  Because A1-4 and A1-6 were both derived from pre-
experimental optimization modeling, the difference in overall performance is likely the result of
differences in workload.
It is important to note that the tasks analyzed in this section were those characterized as fairly
high certainty (see previous discussion in Method).   In addition to providing limited support for
the hypothesis mentioned above, the results also reflect some tenets on organization design
derived from organization theory.  Specifically, when environments can be segmented (e.g., by
tasks) and those tasks are fairly predictable, a divisional organization with fairly autonomous,
task-defined units limited coordination requirements can be quite effective.  This aligns with the
finding that A1-6 has the strongest task accuracy performance on the primary mission tasks. The
question to be addressed next is the relative effectiveness of the three Architectures in
responding to tasks of greater uncertainty and unpredictability.
5.3 Performance on Less Predictable, “Adaptive” Tasks
As described in the Method section, there were only two task categories that met the definition of
higher uncertainty to allow for comparison with the results presented above.  These were the
measures of accuracy for action against enemy SAM and Silkworm missile sites.  These tasks
appeared several times in the simulation.  They would “pop up” at times and places that were
somewhat unpredictable.  There were 3 possible Silkworm threats in the training runs, and 5 in
the trial runs.  Similarly, there were 2 possible SAM threats in the training and 3 in the trial runs.
It should be noted that Silkworms and SAMs were not of equal unpredictability (as defined by
degree of awareness of relevant data [Burton & Obel, 1998]).  Some of the SAM threats were
“prerequisite” tasks for accomplishment of the primary mission tasks of Port and Airport.
Because of this, there were DDD-III based messages sent when a team would attempt to attack
either of these primary mission sites without first addressing the pre-requisite SAM site(s).  In
contrast, Silkworm sites were totally dependent on the teams’ being “heedful” of the more
unpredictable task requirements and determining when and if it was appropriate to shift task
focus from the primary tasks in order to eliminate this threat.
Table 6 presents the ANOVA results testing the effect of Architecture on team performance on
these less predictable tasks.   As with the analysis of primary mission tasks, the differences in
mean performance do not reach the level of statistical significance for either of the missile tasks.
However, for the Silkworm tasks, the F-statistic is approaching a level of statistical significance
(p=.13), suggesting that more data to increase statistical power should be gathered in future
experiments8.  It is noteworthy that the pattern of mean accuracy scores in Table 6 is different
from the consistent pattern shown for the more predictable primary mission tasks in Table 5.  For
these more unpredictable tasks, the pattern shows A0-6 as outperforming A1-6 and A1-4.  If
these preliminary trends can be supported with further data, this would confirm the hypothesis
derived from Galbraith [1977] and others who propose that coordination capability improves
                                                 
8 Due to the way accuracy scores for the two missile tasks are compiled in the DDD-III dependent variable file, it was not
possible to do a more descriptive presentation comparable to Table 5.
organizational effectiveness with uncertain environments and less predictable, complex and
interdependent tasks.
Figure 5 is a graphical presentation of the different overall pattern of mean task accuracy for two
composite scores.  “Predictable Tasks” represents the Total Accuracy measure reported in Table
4 that reflects the average accuracy score for the 7 primary mission tasks.  “Unpredictable tasks”
is an average of the overall accuracy scores for the two sets of missile tasks.  This av rage was
adjusted by the total number of missile task opportunities so that the two graphic measures
would be comparably based on a scale of 0 to 100%.  This pattern of  resul s suggests  it is





















          Table 6.  Comparative Performance on  
           Less Predictable, "Adaptive" Tasks
A1-6 A0-6 A1-4 F-sig.
(N=14) (N=13) (N=11) level
 Silkworms 219 289 188 0.13
  SAMs 116 156 125 0.48
 # enemy penetrations 6.1 6.2 11.3 .006*
* Significant F-statistic, p<.01
Silk and SAM performance: (%Accuracy) x (# accomplished);
important to assess the differential performance of structures on tasks that vary in terms of
uncertainty and the role of coordination as it affects performance.
5.3.1 Effect of Architecture on “General Protection of the Force”
One aspect of Table 6 has yet to be discussed.  As noted in the introduction to this paper, several
of the military officers who participated in Experiment 3 argued that one advantage of structure
A0-6 was that the coordination requirements would contribute to greater effectiveness in
attending to the general protection of the force.  They expressed concern that the optimized
structures designed to increase sub-unit autonomy, while more efficient, ran the risk of losing a
total mission focus [Hocevar t al., 1998].  This concern is often given as a limitation for
divisional organizations [Mintzberg, 1993].
One measure gathered by DDD-III is the number of hostile penetrations.  This represents the
number of times in a simulation that the enemy is able to successfully attack a friendly asset by
using aircraft, sea craft or missiles.  For all of these sources of threat, detection, identification,
timing, and location are somewhat unpredictable.  Only the effectiveness of responses to missile
threats have been analyzed so far because the other “threat” tasks require only a single asset to
respond and thus do not require coordination.  However, the overall number of hostile
penetrations provides a good indicator of the team’s ability to protect against these less
predictable events and thus a measure for “general protection of the force.”  It also demonstrates
the extent to which teams are “heedful” of less predictable events [Weick & Roberts, 1993] and
can effectively redirect assets away from the more programmed offensive tasks, to the less
routine defensive tasks [Waller, 1999].
As shown in Table 5, the ANOVA found a significant effect for Architecture on the average
number of hostile penetrations (p<.01).   Post hoc tests of difference between means (using LSD
test) showed A1-4 to be significantly less effective than either A0-6 or A1-6.  This result does
not allow for a clear interpretation as to whether the major differentiating factor is coordination
capability or workload.  It is possible that coordination capability (highest in A0-6, second
highest in A1-6) led to the higher performance on this measure. Alternatively, the greater
workload experienced by teams in A1-4 could be the cause.  Further experiments will be needed
to clarify this question.  Independent of the resolution of this question, the finding suggests an
important caution.  The results presented on the effect of Architectures on the primary mission
tasks showed A1-4 achieving relatively equivalent performance with A0-6, even though it was
reduced in manning by 1/3.   The findings presented here on the “defensive” capabilities of A1-4,
both as reflected in the missile tasks and the number of enemy penetrations, suggest that it is
important to include a broad range of measures of effectiveness when determining the impact of
reduced manning.
5.4  The Role of Coordination in Performance
While not definitive, the evidence in the section above suggests that coordination plays a role in
effective performance.  This concluding section of the Results examines this question in more
detail.   At the simplest level, it is important to demonstrate that the three structures met the
objective of pre-experimental modeling in terms of differentiation by degree of coordination
required.  Figure 6 shows the means plot derived from an ANOVA that found a significant effect
(p<.001) for Architecture on the average number of “nodes” used per task (using the 7 primary
mission tasks).  As we would expect from the fact that A1-6 and A1-4 were based on pre-
experimental modeling to reduce the amount of required coordination, the means for these two
structures are significantly lower than that for A0-6 (p<.001, using LSD test).































Of greater interest is whether the amount of coordination used in the execution of tasks correlates
with performance as measured by task accuracy.9  Pearson correlation coefficients were
calculated between the number of nodes per task and consequent task accuracy.  Table 7 shows
the correlational results for the two separate missile tasks, classified as higher in uncertainty, and
the composite Task Accuracy score representing the more predictable primary mission tasks.
Table 7.  Correlation between Number of Nodes
 Involved and Task Accuracy
Task
Silkworms               SAMs               Total Task Accuracy
r .71**                        .92**                           .23 (ns)
r = Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed test:
** p < .01
N=27; Note:  Only two six-node structures (A0-6; A1-6) included
Because the A1-4 structure was the most constrained in the likelihood for coordination (due to
only 4 nodes), the table shows the results for only A0-6 and A1-6.10 The correlations between
amount of coordination and performance outcome for both of the more uncertain missile tasks
                                                 
9 Hutchins et al. [1999], in this Proceedings, present a complementary analysis of qualitative communication behaviors as
indicators of coordination processes and their relationship with performance effectiveness.
10 A similar pattern emerged from the analysis of the total sample, with the same statistical significance.
are highly significant (p<.01).  For the more certain tasks represented by the Total Task
Accuracy score, the correlation is not significant.  These results provide additional evidence in
support of Galbraith’s [1977, 1995] theory that increased information processing capability
through lateral coordination mechanisms enhances performance in situations of higher
uncertainty.
6 Conclusions
There is clear evidence reported in this study that the pre-experimental modeling to reduce
coordination requirements for A1-4 and A1-6 was accomplished.  Having established this
distinction, it was possible to test the difference this independent variable had on task
performance.  Two categories of tasks were evaluated.   For the primary mission tasks,
characterized as low in uncertainty, A1-6 shows some evidence of outperforming A0-6 and A1-
4.  This suggests that reducing the requirements for coordination can be a factor in improving
organizational performance when tasks are routine, though complex.
Results that tentatively support a different conclusion were presented for the missile tasks that
represented higher uncertainty.  Performance on these tasks as well as in the “general protection
of the force” as measured by number of enemy penetrations, showed A0-6, with the highest
requirements for coordination, performing as well or better than A1-6 and A1-4.  In addition, the
correlational results provide further evidence for the value of coordination capability in the
effective response to uncertainty.  While some of the findings reported here were not statistically
significant, the patterns are consistent.  In addition, these patterns are supported by theories of
organization design that propose the value of coordination capabilities as an adaptive mechanism
for responding to environmental and task uncertainty [e.g., G lbraith, 1977, 1995; Duncan, 1979;
Burton & Obel, 1998].  For example, Weick’s and Roberts’s [1993]  work on aircraft carriers
suggests that situations that are fluid, high risk, and highly interdependent require teams to be
“heedful” of threatening events and practiced in creating a joint response to these events.  The
results presented here similarly suggest that an organizational design that has some degree of
practiced coordination capability may be more effective in responding to unpredictable, high risk
situations such as the missile tasks and the threats requiring defensive action in the A2C2
scenario.  This tentative conclusion is also supported by the recent work of Waller [1999] with
flight crews in simulator training.  She found that a significant predictor of effectiveness was the
extent to which teams could more quickly change task priorities and re-distribute tasks in
response to a crisis.  Practiced coordination may facilitate that adaptive response.
An obvious limitation of this study is the limited sample size and resulting constraints on
statistical power.  It will be important to follow-up this experiment with both computer
simulations and human-in-the-loop experiments with larger samples to further test these key
concepts.  The major design criteria for Experiment 4 was to replicate and resolve questions
raised in Experiment 3.  For this reason, it was not possible to significantly change the task
domain of the scenario used in the simulation.  Future experiments should increase the number of
tasks that represent the characteristics of uncertainty.  This will allow a more rigorous test of the
role of coordination mechanisms in adaptability.  With a larger number of such tasks, it will also
be possible to qualitatively examine [following Waller, 1999] the processes teams use in dealing
with nonroutine events.   There is evidence reported here supporting the performance benefits
that can be gained by an efficiency-oriented, task-based design with limited coordination
requirements.  There is also evidence for the benefits of an organization design that requires and
thus reinforces coordination.  These two characteristics of organization design are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.  The challenge is to determine the appropriate balance.
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